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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on democracies governed by a Parliament. In such
democracies, the executive branch consists of a subset of parties in the Parliament,
called the Government. A key feature is that the Government is only indirectly
determined by the voters’ electoral decisions. This dissertation address how parlia-
mentary characteristics and institutions influence the composition of the Government
and government outcomes. The composition of the Government reflects the size and
ideological make-up of the Government. Government outcomes reflect the length the
Government survives and the policy consequences of the Government. The litera-
ture focuses on the former criterion. The view is that, in parliamentary democracies,
longer Government duration should be associated with stability and better policies.
The latter is important from the perspective of directly evaluating whether Govern-
ments make good or bad decisions from the perspective of voters. The first chapter of
this dissertation develop a model of the government formation process, where parties
care about and bargain over both policy and office benefits. The model generate pre-
dictions that matches important features of the data. The second chapter uses data
from western European parliamentary democracies to estimate the parameters of the
model in chapter one. The estimation results suggest that coalitions care about both
ideology and office benefits, but more about office benefits. The third chapter studies
which (existing) institutional environments lead to ‘good’ government outcomes. The
results have a number of important implications for constitutional design.
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Preface
Parliamentary democracies are an important system of democratic governance. They
are used in Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Turkey, Aus-
tralia, Canada, Japan, etc. In parliamentary democracies, the election determines
the legislative branch, called the Parliament. However, it does not determine the
executive branch. Instead, parties in Parliament attempt to form coalitions with one
another. The output of the coalition formation process is a particular coalition called
the Government. The Government is the executive branch. It is responsible to the
Parliament and can be terminated if the Parliament loses confidence in the Govern-
ment. But the government is not directly accountable to voters, since it is not directly
elected by the voters. So, there may be a disconnect between policy position chosen
by the Government and the voters’ policy preferences.
My dissertation asks: How do institutions influence the composition of the Govern-
ment and the associated government outcomes? It is important to study government
outcomes because they directly affect voters. Here, we focus on two types of gov-
ernment outcomes. The first is political stability. It is measured by the duration of
the government. This has been show to have important implications for economic
outcomes. (See Alesina et al. (1996) and Barro (1991).) The second is government
policy—whether the policy position is aligned with voters’ policy preferences. So it
directly impacts voter welfare.
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These outcomes are determined by who is in the Government. So to understand
government outcomes, we must also understand the composition of the Government.
In particular, I focus on two aspects of the composition. The first is the size of the
Government. It is the fraction of Parliamentary seats held by parties in the Gov-
ernment. The second is the ideological diversity of the Government. This measures
whether parties in the Government have similar or dissimilar policy preferences.
Outline of the dissertation
Chapter 1 develop a model of the government formation process, where parties
care about and bargain over both policy and office benefits. The equilibrium pre-
dictions match four important features observed in the data. First, ideologically
dissimilar parties can form coalitions with one another. Second, minority or sur-
plus Governments 1 can be formed. Third, delay can occur in equilibrium; that is,
in equilibrium, it may take more than one attempt to form a Government. Fourth,
government outcomes vary across both parliamentary characteristics and institutions.
Chapter 2 uses data from western European parliamentary democracies to esti-
mate the parameters of the model developed in chapter one. In particular, it recovers
how government duration and policy are determined in the government formation
process. In addition, the estimation results suggest that parties care about both
ideology and office benefits, but more about office benefits.
Chapter 3 studies which (existing) institutional environments lead to ‘good’ gov-
ernment outcomes. The results have a number of important implications for consti-
tutional design. First, within parliamentary democracies, a stable government may
comes with policies that are far afield from voters’ policy preference. So it is critical to
1If there exists some party so that the government remains a majority coalition when that party
is removed from the coalition, then the government is a surplus government.
x
evaluate a given institutional reform based on both the policy consequences and the
duration of the Government. Second, there are important synergies between institu-
tional rules. Whether adding a particular institution improves or worsens government
outcomes often depends on the broader institutional environment.
xi
Chapter 1
IDEOLOGY VS. PORK: A MODEL OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION
1.1 Introduction
In parliamentary democracies, the executive branch—the government is not di-
rectly elected by voters. Instead, it is the output of the negotiation process of parties
in the parliament. There is a large literature on the prediction of the outcome of
coalition formation process: Who will be included in the government? Is the govern-
ment comprised of a minority of a majority of members in the parliament? Are the
parties in the government ideologically adjacent to one another?
One standard argument in the literature is that parties should form minimum-
winning and ideologically connected Governments. (See, e.g., von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1953), Gamson (1961), Axelrod (1970) and Swaan (1973), Martin and
Stevenson (2001, 2010), and Martin and Vanberg (2003), among many others.) The
basic idea is that it is ‘cheaper’ to form minimum-winning and ideologically connected
coalitions: they involve giving away fewer office benefits and making fewer ideolog-
ical compromises. In practice, however, minority, majority and ideologically diverse
governments are often formed. For instance, we often observe oversized majority
governments in Germany, minority Governments in Denmark, and ideological diverse
governments in Belgium.
The argument that parties should form minimum-winning and ideologically con-
nected Governments misses two important tradeoffs. First, it misses the fact that
the composition of the Government influences government duration and, in turn, in-
fluence the expected payoffs under different composition. Second, it misses the fact
1
that different parties value office benefits and policy differently; these differences give
parties incentives to trade 1 . This chapter builds a model of government formation
that takes these tradeoffs into account. The model shows that parliamentary char-
acteristics and institutional environments influence whether minimum-winning and
ideologically connected governments are equilibrium predictions.
In particular, the coalition formation process is modeled by a stochastic bargain-
ing game where parties bargain over both office benefits and policy. The equilibrium
predictions match four important features observed in the data. First, ideologically
dissimilar parties can form coalitions with one another. Second, minority or surplus
Governments can be formed. Third, delay can occur in equilibrium; that is, in equilib-
rium, it may take more than one attempt to form a Government. Fourth, government
outcomes vary across both parliamentary characteristics and institutions.
1.2 The Model
There is a finite set of parties, N . Party i ∈ N has a share of seats in the
Parliament pii. Let pi = (pii)i∈N be the distribution of seat shares. In what follows,
Parties will bargain over ideology and office benefits. The ideological position of party
i ∈ N is Ii ∈ R. The total level of office benefits is normalized to φ.
Refer to Figure 1.1. The game starts after the resignation of the incumbent
government. (Before the game starts, the election already happened. So we are
considering the government formation with an exogenous parliament.) There are
four stages of the game. In the first stage, the head of the state chooses a formateur.
In the second stage, the formateur chooses a proto-coalition. In the third stage,
parties in the proto-coalition bargain and form a government. In the fourth stage,
1This feature also appears in the theoretical models of Jackson and Moselle (2002), Chen and
Eraslan (2013a,b).
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Head of State Chooses Formateur k
Formateur Chooses Proto-Coalition C ⊆ N
Bargaining Parties in C Bargain: Policy + Office benefits
Status quo
Break down Agree
Government Formed
Government Dissolved
Parliament Term Expires
Duration
Maximum Duration
New Election: Not Modeled
Incumbent Resigns
Figure 1.1 – Preview of Game
the government survives until it is dissolved. This is the government duration stage.
We now describe the details of each of these stages.
Stage 1 Choosing the Formateur
The head of the state chooses a party to be the formateur, i.e., to form a
government. The paper assumes that the head of the state is non-strategic and
so the choice of the formateur is nonpartisan. This assumption follows Laver
and Shepsle (1996), Baron (1991, 1993) and Diermeier et al. (2003).
So the formateur is randomly chosen. If there is a majority party in the par-
liament, the majority party will be the formateur; otherwise the probability of
a party being the formateur will depend on the seat share of the party and
whether the party contains the former prime minister. Party i is selected as the
3
formateur with probability
pi(pi,m) =

1 if pii ≥ 1/2
exp(α0pii+α1mi)∑
j exp(α0pij+α1mj)
if pij < 1/2 for all j ∈ N
0 if pij ≥ 1/2 for some j 6= i,
(1.1)
where m = (m)i∈N indicates which party contains the former prime minister,
i.e., mi = 1 if the party contains the former prime minister, and mi = 0 other-
wise.
Stage 2 Forming the Proto-Coalition
The formateur chooses a proto-coalition C ⊆ N , i.e., a subset of parties to
potentially form a government. The formateur must include itself in the proto-
coalition.
Stage 3 Bargaining within the Proto-coalition
Parties in the proto-coalition bargain over policy and office benefits. The time-
line of the bargaining stage is as follows:
1. A state of the world is realized and revealed to every party.
2. The formateur chooses either to propose an allocation of ideology and office
benefits or to pass on a proposal.
(a) If the formateur proposes, parties in C sequentially vote to accept or
reject the proposal.
(b) If the proposal is unanimously accepted, a government is inaugurated
and the bargaining stage ends.
3. If either no proposal is offered or a proposal is rejected:
(a) A new state is realized.
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(b) Some party i ∈ C is randomly selected to either propose an allocation
of ideology and office benefits or to pass on a proposal.
(c) Bargaining continues as above.
Note the use of terminology. The term proto-coalition reflects a subset of parties
who will bargain with one another. The term government reflects a proto-
coalition that has agreed to a particular allocation of ideology and office benefits.
Let us review two aspects of the bargaining stage. First, the state can be
seen as summarizing idiosyncratic (economic or political) shocks that cause
governments to be more or less stable 2 . We will see that the state will influence
the government duration stage. In particular, the state s ∈ S is drawn according
an independent and identically distributed stochastic process with absolutely
continuous CDF F (·).
Second, when an attempt to form a government fails, a new party in C is
selected to make a proposal. The probability of party i being a proposer is
p˜i(pi,C) =

1 if pii ≥ 1/2
exp(α2pii)∑
j exp(α2pij)
if pij < 1/2 for all j ∈ C
0 if pij ≥ 1/2 for some j 6= i.
(1.2)
Note that if there is a majority party, the majority party is the proposer; oth-
erwise the probability of a party being the proposer depends on the seat share
of the party. When pi and C are clear from the context, simply write p˜i for
p˜i(pi,C).
2For instance, there is a shock to euro which is thought to have good influences to the economy.
Then parties expect the government will be more stable under the good economic environment and
so they expect to enjoy office benefits and influence policy for a longer period of time.
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Stage 4 Government Duration
The bargaining stage either results in a break down or the inauguration of a
government. If the bargaining breaks down, office benefits are destroyed and
the status quo policy remains in place. If a government is inaugurated, the allo-
cation of office benefits and policy is implemented as the agreed upon proposal.
The allocation is implemented for the entire duration of the government.
Government duration is a random variable. It depends on (a) the time horizon
to the next election T¯ , (b) the institutional environment R, (c) the state of the
world s when the government is formed, (d) the size of the governing coalition
C, and (e) the ideological diversity of the governing coalition C. The size of
C is measured by the sum of the seat shares of all the parties in coalition C,
piC =
∑
i∈C pii. The ideological diversity of C is measured by the standard
deviation of ideological positions of all the parties in coalition C, σICi .
Thus, under proto-coalition C, the length of government duration TC ∈ [0, T¯ ]
is drawn from a distribution with (conditional) density f(tC |s, T¯ , R, piC , σICi ) on
[0, T¯ ].
Given the formateur’s choice of the coalition C, there are two types of bargaining
outcomes. The first is an agreement outcome. This consists of (a) a time period
τC when the parties agree to form a government and (b) an agreed upon allocation
(IC , xC). Here IC ∈ R is the policy position and xC = (xCi )i∈N is the allocation of
office benefits. The second is a disagreement outcome. This consists of an allocation
(IQ, 0), where IQ is the status quo policy and 0 represents the fact that office benefits
are destroyed. We now describe the payoffs of these different outcomes.
Start with the agreement outcome. The payoff of the agreement outcome depends
on an instantaneous payoff, government duration, and the time it takes to form a
6
government. We now expand on these elements. Under the agreement outcome
(IC , xC), the instantaneous payoff of party i ∈ N is
Ui(I
C , xC) = xCi + bi exp{−(Ii − I)2}+ ψCi ,
where bi indicates party i’s preference for policy over office benefits and
ψCi =
 ε
C
i if i ∈ C,
ηCi if i /∈ C.
represents the taste shocks of party i when proto-coalition C forms a Government.
These taste shocks may be different when party i is or is not in the coalition. Prior
to the game, these shocks are known to all players, but they will not be observed by
the econometrician.
Parties obtain the instantaneous payoffs so long as the government is in power.
Write dC(s, T¯ , R, piC , σIC ) ≡ E[TC |s, T¯ , R, piC , σIC ] for the conditional expectation of
duration. When T¯ , R, piC and σIC are clear from the context simply write d
C(s, ·),
and when s is also clear form the context simply write dC(·). So the expected payoff
of party i at the time that parties reach an agreement is dC(·)Ui(IC , xC). Note that
parties do not discount the instantaneous payoffs 3 .
Parties have a distaste for bargaining. If an agreement is reached in period τC ,
the expected payoff of party i is δτ
c
dC(·)Ui(IC , xC), where δ ∈ (0, 1) represents the
distaste for bargaining.
Now turn to the disagreement outcome. If the bargaining breaks down, the in-
stantaneous payoff for party i ∈ N is
Ui(I
Q, 0) = bi exp{−(Ii − IQ)2}.
3This assumption is for simplification.
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1.3 Equilibrium Characterization
The bargaining model described above is a special case in the class of stochastic
bargaining games studied by Merlo and Wilson (1995, 1997). It follows from Theorem
3 in Merlo and Wilson (1997) that there is an unique stationery subgame perfect
equilibrium. There are three important feature of the equilibrium. These features are
important for identification strategy in Chapter 2 4 .
Proposition 1. Government policy is determined by the Government Policy Condi-
tion:
IC =
∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}Ii∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}
. (1.3)
That is, the government policy position depends on the composition of the proto-
coalition, but does not depend on when the proto-coalition reaches an agreement or
who is chosen as the proposer in the bargaining process.
This feature arises from the following fact: given a proto-coalition C, each proposer
will make a proposal (xC , IC), which maximizes the proto-coalition’s payoff from
government policy,
∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}. If not, the proposer would have a
profitable deviation in which he maximizes the utility from ideology and keeps more
office benefits. As a consequence, the government policy position only depends on
the ideological positions and preference weights of parties in the Government.
Proposition 2. On the equilibrium path, coalition C agrees in state s if and only if
dC(s, ·)uC > yC(T¯ , R, piC , σIC ), where
uC =
[
φ+
∑
i∈C bi
(
exp{−(Ii − IC)2} − exp{−(Ii − IQ)2}
)]
,
and yC(·) solves
yC(·) = δ
∫
max
{
dC(s′, ·)uC , yC(·)} dF (s′), (1.4)
4The proofs are in the appendix.
8
Refer to this as the Bargaining-Cutoff Condition. This feature arises from the
following fact: a party agrees on a proposal at a state if and only if the expected
payoff at that state is higher than his reservation utility. Thus, on the equilibrium
path, coalition C agrees in state s if and only if the coalitions’ expected payoff is
higher than the total reservation utility of all parties in the coalition. Notice that
parties face tradeoffs between the cost of delay and a higher expected payoff. On
the one hand, parties have a distaste for bargaining, so they would want to reach
an agreement as soon as possible. On the other hand, when a bad state is drawn,
parties would want to wait for a better state associated with a longer duration and
so a higher expected payoff. Thus, efficient delay can occur in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium, with probability 1 agreement will be reached
within a finite amount of time. The expected equilibrium payoff to formateur k is
Wk(C, T¯ , R, pi
C , σIC ) =
1− δ(1− p˜k)
δ
yC(·) + εCk . (1.5)
Refer to this as the Formateur’s Payoff Condition. This feature arises from a
payoff calculation. The formateur’s expected payoff is increasing in the coalition’s
reservation utility yC(·), which drives the formateur’s desire for a larger ‘pie’. It is
also increasing in the likelihood of the formateur being a proposer p˜k—the bargaining
power of the formateur. This is because, the more bargaining power, the more share
of the ‘pie’ would be distributed to the formateur. It is decreasing in the distaste of
bargaining δ.
Let ∆k be the collection of subsets in N that contain k. Then the equilibrium
proto-coalition choice Ck ∈ ∆k of formateur k is
Ck = arg max
C∈∆k
1− δ(1− p˜k)
δ
yC(·) + εCk . (1.6)
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1.4 Predictions of the Model
There are four important features of the data that are captured by the equilibrium
predictions of the model. Section 1.4.1 describes these features of the data. Section
1.4.2 discuss how they are delivered by the assumptions of the model.
1.4.1 Data
The sample consists of 200 governments in 7 Western European parliamentary
democracies over the period of 1947-1999 5 . These countries are Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway and Sweden 6 . Now we describe four
important features of the data.
First, we observe both ideologically diverse and tight-knit governments. Figure
1.2 is the histogram of the ideological diversity of the government. We can see that
there are many ideologically tight-knit governments. In particular, Figure 1.3 shows
that about 38% of the governments contains only a single party. About 25% of
the governments consist of parties that are ideologically adjacent to one another.
Nevertheless, about 38% of the governments are ideological disconnected, i.e., they
consists of parties that are not ideologically adjacent.
Second, we observe minority, minimum winning and surplus governments. Figure
1.4 is the histogram of the size of the government. We can see that there are gov-
ernments with less than half of the parliamentary seats. But, there are also some
fairly large governments—with more than 60% of the parliamentary seats. In partic-
ular, Figure 1.5 shows that about 44% of the governments are minority governments.
(A minority government controls strictly less than 50% of the parliamentary seats.)
About 23% of the governments are surplus governments. (If there exists some party
5The data of government policy and government formation are not available after 1999.
6Data sources are DEM, Benoit et al. (2013) and Volkens et al. (2013).
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so that the government remains a majority coalition when that party is removed from
the coalition, then the government is a surplus government.) About 32% of the gov-
ernments are minimum winning governments. (If removing any one of the parties
from the coalition results in a minority coalition, then the government is a minimum
winning government.)
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Third, we observe government outcomes vary across countries. Figure 1.6 shows
12
mean duration of governments across countries. Figure 1.7 shows mean ideological
losses of governments across countries. Ideological losses are measured by the gap
between government policy and voters’ policy preferences 7 . These countries differ
in terms of both parliamentary characteristics and institutional environments. So,
government outcomes appear to vary across both parliamentary characteristics and
institutional environments.
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Finally, we have data on how parties negotiate to form a Government. Figure 1.8
is the histogram of the number of attempts it takes to form a government. Note that
about 61% of all governments are formed in the first attempt and 97% of all govern-
ments are formed within 4 attempts. So, we observe both immediate agreements and
delays in reaching agreements.
7Here we assume the parliament represents voters’ policy preferences.
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1.4.2 Discussion: From Model to Data
The first two features are about the composition of the government. As men-
tioned in Section 1.1, one standard argument in the literature is that parties should
form minimum-winning and ideologically connected Governments. This is because it
is ‘cheaper’ to form minimum-winning and ideologically connected coalitions: they
involve giving away fewer office benefits and making fewer ideological compromises.
Clearly, Section 1.4.1 shows that the prediction of this literature does not match the
observed data: We do observe a fair number of minority, surplus and ideologically
disconnected governments.
By contrast, the model in this chapter can generate these predictions. There are
two independent reasons that this can occur. The first reason is that parties tradeoff
ideology and office benefits differently. Thus, parties which place a higher value on
office benefits over ideology may want to form a coalition with ideological distant
parties who care less about office benefits. Parties which place a higher value on
14
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ideology over office benefits may want to form a coalition with ideologically adjacent
parties, even if those parties are larger and require sharing more office benefits. The
second reason is that duration depends on ideological diversity and size. The model
does not make explicit assumptions on how ideology and size influence duration.
If, in practice, size increases duration, parties may have incentive to form surplus
governments (i.e., to increase the size of the pie). This may, in turn, require parties
to form ideologically diverse governments.
The third feature is that government outcomes vary across both parliamentary
characteristics and institutions. This comes from the assumption that duration de-
pends on size, ideological diversity, and institutional rules. Different parliamentary
characteristics—specifically, the seat share and the ideological composition of the
parliament—affect size and ideological diversity and, in turn, they influence dura-
tion. This will influence the formateur’s choice of coalition members and, thereby,
influence government outcomes. Likewise, changing institutions also affects duration
15
and, in turn influences the composition of the government and government outcomes.
The fourth feature is that delay can occur in equilibrium. That is, it may take
more than one attempt to form a government. This arises from the assumption
that government duration depends on the state. If a bad state is drawn, parties
expect duration to be short (i.e., a small pie) and, therefore, a lower expected payoff.
Parties may (efficiently) want to delay agreement and wait for a better state. As a
consequence, there is a trade off between the time it takes to form a government and
expected longer duration.
1.5 Appendix
Proofs for Proposition 1 Notice that, if an agreement reached in any period, the
proposer can extract all of the surplus above what it would take to get other parties
to agree. Write Vi(s) for the reservation utility for party i with state s. the Suppose
party k is the proposer, the non-proposer j 6= k will get
Vj(s) = δEs′,p˜(Vj). (1.7)
Assume the proposer offers (xC , IC) in the agreement, then the agreement will offer
the proposer k: an agreement will induce the proposer expected utility
Vk(s) = max
IC
{
dCuC − δEs′,p˜
[∑
j 6=k
Vj
]
, δEs′,p˜Vk
}
. (1.8)
Solve for optimal IC gives the Government Policy Condition (Equation (1.3)):
IC =
∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}Ii∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}
.
Proofs for Proposition 2 Following the standard argument in the bargaining
literature, in any equilibrium, with probability 1 agreement will be reached within a
finite amount of time.
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In any equilibrium, a party agrees on a proposal at a state if and only if the
expected payoff at that state is higher than his reservation utility. Write y ≡
δEs′,p˜
(∑
i∈C Vi
)
for the total reservation utility of parties in coalition C. Then on
the equilibrium path, coalition C agrees in state s if and only if
dC(s, ·)
[
φ+
∑
i∈C
bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}
]
> yC(T¯ , R, piC , σIC ).
We now solve for yC(·).
Given the optimal IC , Equation (1.8) can be rewritten as
Vk(s) = max
{
dC(s)uC − y, 0}+ δ[p˜kEs(Vk) + (1− p˜k)Es(V −k )] (1.9)
where uC =
[
φ+
∑
i∈C bi
(
exp{−(Ii − IC)2} − exp{−(Ii − IQ)2}
)]
, and Es(V
−
k ) is
the equilibrium payoff conditional on not being the proposer.
If the government forms, the proposer only offer the others their reservation value.
Then whether the government is formed or not, non-proposers get
Es(V
−
k ) = δEs′,p˜Vk = δ[p˜kEs(Vk) + (1− p˜k)Es(V −k )]
Then we can solve for Es(V
−
k ) and get
Es(V
−
k ) =
δp˜kEs(Vk)
1− δ(1− p˜k)
Substituting in (1.9), we get
Vk(s) = max
{
dC(s)uC − y, 0}+ δp˜kEs(Vk)
1− δ(1− p˜k)
Integrating over s, and solving for Es(Vk), we have
Es[Vk] =
1− δ(1− p˜k)
1− δ
∫
max
{
dC(s)uC − y, 0} dF (s) (1.10)
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Now, adding the payoffs of all i ∈ C from (1.7) and (1.8), we get
∑
j∈C
Vj(s) = max{dC(s)uC − y + δ
∑
i∈C
Es′,p˜Vi, δ
∑
i∈C
Es′,p˜[Vi]}
= max
{
dC(s)uC − y, 0}
= max
{
dC(s)uC , y
}
.
Then integrating both sides by s′, p˜,
∑
i∈C
Es′,p˜Vi(s) =
∫
max
{
dC(s)uC , y
}
dF (s)
Note that y ≡ δEs′,p˜
(∑
i∈C Vi
)
then
y = δ
∫
max
{
dC(s)uC , y
}
dF (s)
= δ
∫
max
{
dC(s)uC − y, 0} dF (s) + δy.
Rearranging this equation gives the Bargaining-Cutoff Condition (Equation (1.4)).
Proofs for Proposition 3 Rewrite Equation (1.4) to∫
max
{
dC(s)uC − y, 0} dF (s) = 1− δ
δ
y.
Substitute it in (1.10), we get
Es[Vk] =
1− δ(1− p˜k)
δ
y.
So the formateur’s expected payoff of choosing C is
Wk(C, T¯ , R, pi
C , σ2IC ) =
1− δ(1− p˜k)
δ
y + εCk .
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Chapter 2
ESTIMATING THE MODEL OF GOVERNMENT FORMATION
2.1 Introduction
In practice, both parliamentary characteristics and institutional rules appear to
have important implications for the composition of the Government and government
outcomes. For instance, the June 1958 election in Belgium changed parliamentary
characteristics. Prior to the election, the Government was Cabinet Van Acker IV,
while post-election the Government was Cabinet Eysken II. These two governments
differed in the composition of the Government and government outcomes. Cabinet
Van Acker IV was larger and more ideologically diverse. It implemented more right
wing policies and had a longer duration. Similarly, countries that systematically differ
in institutional rules also differ systematically in the composition of Governments and
government outcomes. In Denmark, minority Governments are often formed; in Ger-
many, the norm is majority Governments. In Norway, Governments are ideologically
tight-knit; in Belgium, Governments are more ideologically diverse. Governments in
Italy are very short; in the Netherlands, Governments are stable and last long. (See
Laver and Schofield (1990), Mu¨ller and Strøm (2000).)
This chapter uses data from western European parliamentary democracies to es-
timate the model in Chapter 1. In so doing, we can recover the coalition formation
process. Thus, we can address questions as: How parties trade off ideology vs. office
benefits? Do size and ideological diversity have direct effects on government duration
or policy? How do the institutions directly influence government outcomes? Here,
institutions concern a set of rules that influence how governments form and termi-
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nate. This chapter studies four such institutional rules: an investiture vote, negative
versus positive parliamentarism, a constructive vote of no confidence, and a fixed
interelection period. Section 2.2.1 describes these rules.
There is a difficulty in empirically estimating the effect of parliamentary char-
acteristics and institutions on the composition of the Government and government
outcomes: The composition of the Government and government outcomes are simul-
taneously determined in equilibrium. When a party decides whom to include in its
coalition, it anticipates the associated government outcomes. Thus, in equilibrium,
the composition of the government depends on government outcomes. In particu-
lar, in the coalition formation process, there are tradeoffs amongst the distribution of
office benefits, government policy and government duration: On the one hand, chang-
ing ideological diversity or the size of the coalition may result in a longer or shorter
government duration; with a longer duration, coalition members can get more office
perks and have a larger influence on government policy. On the other hand, changing
ideological diversity or the size of the coalition may require sharing more office perks
with other parties or making more compromises on government policy.
Likewise, in equilibrium, government outcomes also depend on the composition
of the Government. Take ideological diversity as an example. Changing ideological
diversity has direct effects on government policy. It also has direct effects on dura-
tion. (Warwick (1994) argues that ideologically dissimilar Governments may have
a shorter duration because their members must make greater policy compromises.
Strøm (1990) argues that ideological diversity may increases duration, because par-
ties effectively exploit issue-by-issue differences between opposition parties.) There
is also an important indirect effect, which works through an endogenous channel.
Decreasing ideological diversity may force the coalition to decrease its size. In turn,
decreasing size shortens government duration. (See e.g. Laver and Schofield (1990)
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and Diermeier et al. (2003).) So decreasing ideological diversity may indirectly shorten
duration.
To address the fact that the composition of the government and government out-
comes are simultaneously determined, this chapter uses structural estimation. It
adopts the model of chapter 1. It explicitly models the coalition formation process
and has equilibrium predictions that match important features of the data. By es-
timating the primitives of the model (i.e., imposing equilibrium conditions on the
data), it backs out the coalition formation process.
One interesting estimation result is that in equilibrium, coalitions care about both
ideology and office benefits, but care more about office benefits than policy. The
premise of this dissertation is that legislators are motivated by both ideology and of-
fice benefits. Each of these incentives has been discussed in the theoretical literature.
(See Hotelling (1929), Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985), Callander (2008).) Though
the estimation suggests that coalitions seem to be more motivated by office bene-
fits, ideological component in the model still plays an important role to government
outcomes. (See Chapter 3.)
Using the estimated model, this chapter also investigates the effect of size (re-
spectively, ideological diversity) on duration holding fixed level of ideological diversity
(respectively, size) and the institutions. For any set of institutions, increasing size
appears to increase duration. Increasing ideological diversity may increase or decrease
duration, depending on the set of institutions. Therefore, the joint effect of size and
duration will depend on the institutions in place.
The results suggest systematic interactions between institutions and the effect of
ideological diversity on duration. For instance, adding the investiture vote to the
institutional environment appears to add a negative trend to the effect of ideological
diversity on duration. That is, with the addition of the investiture vote to the in-
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stitutional environment, there is a lower level of government duration for any given
level of ideological diversity. This captures the direct effect of the investiture vote on
duration.
2.2 Data
A significant component of the data in this paper is from DEM. DEM collects a
large dataset on the process of government formation. The data consist of 7 Western
European countries over the period of 1947-1999. It has information on the identity
of the formateur, the composition of the proto-coalition, the number of attempts to
form a government, the sequence of proposers (if the formateur does not succeed
in forming a new government on the first attempt), government duration, the in-
stitutional features, the maximum time to the next election, the incumbent’s party,
and the seat distribution. Their data draws from several sources, most notably from
Keesings Record of World Events (1944-2000).
Ideology does not enter DEM’s model. As such, there is no ideological component
in their dataset. By contrast, the main focus of this paper is about the ideological
impact on government formation. This calls for three aspects of data that DEM
does not have: (a) party ideology (a preference component); (b) government policy
(an equilibrium outcome); and (c) the preference weight between office benefits and
ideology (bi).
The party ideological data is from Benoit et al. (2013). The government policy
data is constructed from Volkens et al. (2013). Both policy and parties’ ideological
positions in the dataset are determined by text analysis. The government policy
dataset is implemented following Lowe et al. (2011) 1 .
1Benoit et al. (2013) is implemented following Lowe et al. (2011).
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Estimating the preference weight for each party in the model (i.e., bi) uses the
Experts Survey dataset of Laver and Hunt (1992). This dataset asks experts in
each country of the sample to evaluate how parties within their country are willing to
trade off office benefits vs. policy. There will be two difficulties in using this dataset to
estimate the preference weights. One difficulty is a scaling problem, and the second
difficulty is a missing data issue. These difficulties and solutions are discussed in
Section 2.4.1.
The sample consists of 200 governments in 7 Western European countries over
the period 1947-1992 2 . The countries are Belgium (34 governments), Denmark
(30 governments), Germany (23 governments), Italy (46 governments), Netherlands
(16 governments), Norway (25 governments), and Sweden (26 governments). All the
countries have been parliamentary democracies since World War II and elect their
parliament according to proportional representation.
An observation is identified with a government. It is defined by the identity of
the formateur party (k), the composition of the proto-coalition (Ck), the number of
attempts to form the government (τCk), the sequence of proposers if the formateur
does not succeed in forming the government at the first attempt (l2, . . . , lτCk ), the
policy announced by the formed government (ICk), and the number of days that the
government survives (tCk). For each government in the sample, we will also observe
a vector of constitutional rules (R), the time horizon to the next scheduled election
(T¯ ), the set of parties in the parliament (N), the vector of party seat shares (pi), the
vector of party ideological positions ((Ii)i∈N), and the party that contains the former
prime minister (k−1).
Figures 2.1-2.6 present an overview of the aggregate features of the data. Figure
2.1 is the histogram of formateur size (i.e. formateur seat share). Note that, in about
2The sample in DEM consists of 255 governments.
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Figure 2.1 – Histogram of Formateur Seat Share
10% of all governments, the formateur controls an absolute majority of the parlia-
mentary seats. When the formateur controls less than half of the parliamentary seats,
there is a positive correlation between a party’s size and its recognition probability.
Figure 2.2 shows the histogram of the number of attempts to form a government.
Note that about 61% of all governments are formed in the first attempt and 97%
of all governments are formed within 4 attempts. Figure 2.3 shows the histogram
of government duration. About 36% of all governments last less than one year and
about 20% of all governments last to their maximum potential duration 3 . Figure
2.4 shows the histogram of government size. About 81% of all governments control
between 40% and 60% of the parliamentary seats. Only about 5% of all governments
control either less than 20% or more than 80% of the parliamentary seats.
Figure 2.5 shows the histogram of government ideology. Figure 2.6 shows the
histogram of ideological diversity within a government. This is measured by the stan-
dard deviation of party ideology within a government. The levels of the government
ideology and ideological diversity are not meaningful. Rather, they are presented to
illustrate that there is variation in government ideology and ideological diversity.
3Note that this histogram does not reflect the maximum potential duration.
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Figure 2.2 – Histogram of Negotiation Rounds
Figure 2.3 – Histogram of Government Duration
Figure 2.4 – Histogram of Government Size
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Figure 2.5 – Histogram of Government Policy Positions
Figure 2.6 – Histogram of Party Ideological Diversity
The descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 2.1. Here MI-
NORITY is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if and only if the government is a
minority coalition (i.e., it controls strictly less than 50% of the parliamentary seats).
MAJORITY is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if and only if the government is a
majority coalition (i.e, it controls at least 50% of the parliamentary seats). MINWIN
is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if and only if the government is a minimum
winning majority coalition (i.e., if removing any one of the parties from the coalition
results in a minority coalition). SURPLUS is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if and
only if the government is a surplus majority coalition (i.e., if there exists some party
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so that the government remains a majority coalition when that party is removed
from the coalition). Note that 44% of all governments in the sample are minority
governments, 33% are minimum winning coalitions, and 23% are surplus coalitions.
Minority governments are on average less stable than majority governments. That is,
the mean government duration of minority governments (512 days) is smaller than
that of majority governments (673 days). Moreover, minimum winning governments
are on average more stable than surplus governments. That is, the mean government
duration of minimum winning governments (808 days) is larger than that of surplus
governments (488 days).
Tables 2.2-2.4 illustrate that the characteristics of governments vary across coun-
tries. Table 2.2 reports the average number of formation attempts, the average gov-
ernment duration, the average size of the government, and the average ideological
position of the government. Table 2.3 reports the distribution of minority, minimum
winning, and surplus governments. Table 2.4 reports the average standard devia-
tion of party ideology. Note that the average ideological position of the government
and the average standard deviation of party ideology are not meaningful; what is
important is the fact that there is variation across countries.
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Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Number of Attempts 1.74 1.18 1.00 7.00
Duration 601.29 429.75 7.00 1637.00
Time to Next Election 1188.40 391.62 133.00 1841.00
Number of Parties 5.95 1.97 3.00 12.00
Size of Coalition (%) 52.12 11.88 11.20 90.10
MINORITY 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
MAJORITY 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
MINWIN 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
SURPLUS 0.23 0.43 0.00 1.00
Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics
Country Mean Attempts Mean Duration Mean Size (%) Policy: Log Left Right
Belgium 2.41 494.85 60.66 38.28
Denmark 1.77 626.40 40.66 39.72
Germany 1.09 695.78 57.49 17.71
Italy 1.85 320.57 51.46 19.27
Netherlands 2.75 986.94 66.31 61.95
Norway 1.08 754.80 46.65 66.92
Sweden 1.19 739.69 47.11 22.51
Average 1.74 601.29 52.12 35.18
Table 2.2 – Government Formation and Duration
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Country % Minority % Minimum Winning (%) Surplus
Belgium 17.65 47.06 35.29
Denmark 86.67 13.33 0.00
Germany 13.04 69.57 17.39
Italy 45.65 6.52 47.83
Netherlands 0.00 43.75 56.25
Norway 64.00 36.00 0.00
Sweden 65.39 34.62 0.00
Average 44.50 32.00 23.50
Table 2.3 – Distribution of Government Size Category
Country Mean Std of Ideology
Belgium 0.72
Denmark 0.49
Germany 0.40
Italy 0.47
Netherlands 0.61
Norway 0.15
Sweden 0.23
Average 0.45
Table 2.4 – Distribution of Ideological Diversity
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2.2.1 Institutions
This paper focuses on four institutional rules. Countries in the sample vary across
these rules. (See Table 2.5.) We now describe the four institutional rules.
The first institutional rule is an investiture vote. If there is an investiture vote, the
government needs a vote by parliament to legally assume office. The dummy variable
INVEST indicates whether or not the government requires an investiture vote. In
particular, INVEST=Y (N) if and only if the government requires (does not require)
an investiture vote.
The second institutional rule pertains to whether the government requires positive
parliamentarism or whether negative parliamentarism is sufficient. Positive parlia-
mentarism is a requirement that the government obtains continued explicit support
of a parliamentary majority to remain in power. Under negative parliamentarism,
the lack of opposition by a parliamentary majority is sufficient. The dummy variable
NEG indicates whether negative parliamentarism is sufficient for the government to
remain in power. In particular, PARL=+ if positive parliamentarism is required;
PARL=- if negative parliamentarism is sufficient.
The third institutional rule is a constructive vote of no confidence. If there is a
constructive vote of no confidence, a government can be voted out of office only if
there is an immediate alternative replacement government on the table. The dummy
variable CVOTE indicates whether a constructive vote of no confidence is required.
In particular, CCONF=Y (N) if and only if there is (not) a constructive vote of no
confidence.
The fourth institutional rule is a fixed interelection period. If there is a fixed
interelection period, then elections must be held at predetermined intervals. In coun-
tries without a fixed interelection period, the parliament can be dissolved before the
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expiration of the parliamentary term and it can start a new term by calling early
elections. The dummy variable FIX indicates whether there is a fixed pre-election
period. In particular, FIX=Y (N) if and only if there is (not) a fixed interelection
period.
Country INVEST PARL CVOTE FIX
Belgium Y + N N
Denmark N - N N
Germany N + Y N
Italy Y + N N
Netherlands N + N N
Norway N - N Y
Sweden N - N Y
Table 2.5 – Institutional Environment across Countries
2.3 Model
This chapter adopts the model of government formation in Chapter 1. An outcome
of the game consists of a formateur, a proto-coalition, the number of attempts to
form a government, a sequence of proposers, and either (a) an agreed upon policy
and distribution of office benefits or (b) disagreement amongst parties in the proto-
coalition. Each of these features will be observed in the data, with one exception: the
distribution of office benefits. (See Section 2.2.) Traditionally, office benefits is seen
as a distribution of cabinet seats. (See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al. (2005).) But, office
benefits can also reflect other benefits to office, e.g., monetary side payments. Such
benefits are often unobserved. We will back out the total level of office benefits from
the data.
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Three conditions are critical to the econometric specification. The first condition is
the Government Policy Condition. In equilibrium, each proposer is going to maximize
the coalition’s expected payoff. As a consequence, government policy is determined
by Equation 1.3:
IC =
∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}Ii∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}
.
The second condition is the Bargaining Cutoff Condition. On the equilibrium
path, coalition agrees if and only if coalition’s expected payoff is greater than its
reservation utility. In this chapter, we normalize each party’s payoff from the dis-
agreement outcome to be 0 4 . So coalition C agrees in state s if and only if
dC(s, ·)uC > yC(T¯ , R, piC , σIC ), where uC = φ +
∑
i∈C bi
(
exp{−(Ii − IC)2}
)
, and
yC(·) solves
yC(·) = δ
∫
max
{
dC(s′, ·)uC , yC(·)} dF (s′), (2.1)
The third condition is the Formateur’s Payoff Condition. The formateur chooses
a coalition to maximize its expected payoff. The expected equilibrium payoff to
formateur k is described by Equation 1.5:
Wk(C, T¯ , R, pi
C , σIC ) =
1− δ(1− p˜k)
δ
yC(·) + εCk .
2.4 Econometric Specification
This paper uses a two-step estimation process to identify the model parameters.
The first step estimates preference weights, i.e. the bi’s, up to a scale. The second
step uses the results of first step to estimate the scale and the model.
4The key assumption is that parties do not have differential payoffs from disagreement. This
assumption does not change the bargaining outcome within any given proto-coalition, but can change
the formateur’s choice of coalition.
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2.4.1 Estimation of the Preference Weights
As described in Section 2.2, this paper uses Laver and Hunt’s (1992) dataset
to estimate the preference weights. The dataset gives expert survey estimates for
party i, written bˆi. There are two difficulties in using bˆi as the data for preference
weights. The first difficulty is a scaling problem. The bˆi’s are informative about the
relative tradeoffs (between office benefits and ideology) across parties, but they are
not informative about levels of the tradeoffs. In particular, any scale can be used as
preference weights. Estimating the model requires identifying the scale that fits the
model. The scale is captured by φ. The second difficulty is a missing data problem.
Laver and Hunt (1992) does not provide estimates of preference weights for all parties
in the sample. So, the missing preference weights need to be recovered.
To recover the missing preference weights, view bi as a function of bˆi. In particular,
take bi = exp(βbˆi). The parameter β reflects a relationship between bi and bˆi: If β > 0,
there is a positive correlation between bi and bˆi; the data will tell us there is such
a positive correlation 5 . The paper estimates the parameter β, within Laver and
Hunt’s (1992) dataset. It then uses the estimated β’s to recover the missing bi’s. Now
turn to how this is implemented.
To estimate β, use the equilibrium Government Policy Condition (Equation (1.3)).
Given a proto-coalition C, we know
IC =
∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}Ii∑
i∈C bi exp{−(Ii − IC)2}
+ νQ+ ξ.
Here, Q is a vector of control variables that are orthogonal to coalition formation
process but correlated with government policy, i.e. GDP, a year dummy, and a
decade dummy. The variable ξ is a structural error that captures other unobserved
factors orthogonal to coalition formation process but correlated with government
5The exponential function is a common choice in the literature.
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policy. Since bi = exp(βbˆi), the above equation can be rewritten as
IC =
∑
i∈C exp{βbˆi − (Ii − IC)2}Ii∑
i∈C exp{βbˆi − (Ii − IC)2}
+ νQ+ ξ. (2.2)
We can observe IC , Ii, and bˆi in data. So, β and ν can be estimated by solving
the following problem:
min
(β,ν)
ξ = min
(β,ν)
{
IC −
∑
i∈C exp{βbˆi − (Ii − IC)2}Ii∑
i∈C exp{βbˆi − (Ii − IC)2}
+ νQ
}
.
Notice that β can only be identified up to the scale φ. So for all the parties in the
sample of Laver and Hunt (1992), we can identify bi = f(bˆi; β) up to the scale φ.
We use this to recover the missing preference weights (i.e., the bi’s for the parties
that are not in the sample of Laver and Hunt (1992)). The key assumption is that
the preference weights bi’s are constant over time. With this, fix a proto-coalition
C and refer to Equation (2.2). If we can observe bˆj for all but one party j
′ in the
proto-coalition, then we can infer bi up to the scale φ. Since bi is constant over time,
the dataset of Laver and Hunt (1992) is rich enough to back out all the missing bi’s
up to the scale φ.
So far we have identified all the bi’s up to the scale φ. The next step of the estima-
tion will identify φ (along with other model parameters) using maximum likelihood
estimation.
2.4.2 Estimation of the Model
For the second step of the estimation, this paper adopts a specification similar to
DEM. This uses maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the model parameters.
Recall, an observation is defined as a vector of (k, Ck, τ
Ck , l2 . . . lτCk , tk). For each
observation in the sample, the exogenous characteristics are described as a vector of
Z = (R, T¯ , k−1, (Ii)i∈N , pi).
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Write θ for the model parameters. (This section will later specify what those
parameters are.) Of course, the likelihood function will depend on the model pa-
rameters. The contribution to the likelihood function of each observation m is the
probability of observing the vector of (endogenous) events (k, Ck, τ
Ck , l2 . . . lτCk , tk)m
conditional on the vector of (exogenous) characteristics Zm = (T¯ , R,N, pi, k−1, I)m .
Write the likelihood function as
Lm ≡ Pr
(
(k, Ck, τ
Ck , l2 . . . lτCk , t
Ck)m|Zm; θ
)
.
The above equation can be rewritten as
Lm = Pr(k|Z; θ)× Pr(Ck|k, Z; θ)× Pr
(
τCk |k, Ck, Z; θ
)
× Pr (l2 . . . lτCk |k, Ck, τCk , Z; θ)× Pr (tCk |l2 . . . lτCk , τCk , k, Ck, Z; θ) ,
We now discuss how to calculate these components.
Note that Equation (1.1) gives the probability of party k being formateur, i.e.,
Pr(k|Z; θ) = pk (pi, k−1;α0, α1) . (2.3)
Similarly, Equation (1.2) gives the probability of parties l2, . . . , lτ being proposers
when the first attempt to form a government fails in proto-coalition Ck, i.e.,
Pr
(
l2 . . . lτCk |k, Ck, τCk , Z; θ
)
= Π
τCk
j=2p˜lj (pi,Ck;α2) , (2.4)
Now turn to compute Pr(Ck|k, Z; θ). Consider the decision problem faced by the
formateur party k. For each possible coalition C ∈ ∆k, party k can compute its
expected equilibrium payoff if C is chosen as the proto-coalition. The formateur’s ex-
pected payoff is given by Formateur’s Payoff Condition (Equation (1.5)) and depends
on the expected outcome of the bargaining process as well as the formateur’s tastes for
its coalition members, εCk . From the perspective of the formateur that knows its own
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taste, the optimal coalition choice is deterministic. However, from the perspective of
the econometrician, εCk is a random variable. This implies that the expected payoff
Wk(C, T¯ , R, pi
C , σIC ) is also a random variable. Following Rust (1987), McFadden
(1973), Diermeier et al. (2003) and many others, this paper assumes the following:
for each k, the random variable εCk is independent and identically distributed accord-
ing to a type 1 extreme value distribution with standard deviation ρ 6 . Thus, the
probability that formateur k chooses a particular proto-coalition Ck ∈ ∆k to form a
government is
Pr(Ck|k, Z; θ) = Pr
(
Wk(Ck, T¯ , R, pi
Ck , σICk ) > Wk(C, T¯ , R, pi
C , σIC ),∀C ∈ ∆k
)
=
exp
(
[1−δ(1−p˜k(pi,Ck)]yC
δρ
)
∑
C∈∆k exp
(
[1−δ(1−p˜k(pi,C)]yC
δρ
)
Now turn to compute Pr
(
τCk |k, Ck, Z; θ
)
and Pr
(
tCk |l2 . . . lτCk , τCk , k, Ck, Z; θ
)
:
The former is the conditional probability that proto-coalition Ck takes τ
Ck attempts
to form a government. The latter is the conditional probability that the government
lasts tCk days.
For simplicity, write uCk ≡∑i∈Ck Ui(ICk , xCk) for the total instantaneous utility .
Then the conditional probability that proto-coalition Ck takes τ
Ck attempts to form
a government is
Pr
(
τCk |k, Ck, Z; θ
)
=
[
Pr
(
uCkdCk < yCk
)]τ−1
Pr
(
uCkdCk ≥ yCk) (2.5)
The conditional probability that the government last tCk days following τCk attempts
is
Pr
(
tCk |l2 . . . lτCk , τCk , k, Ck, Z; θ
)
= Pr
(
t|uCkdCk ≥ yCk) (2.6)
Note, computing the above two probabilities requires computing uCk , dCk and yCk .
Now turn to how these three components are computed.
6This is the standard assumption in the literature to model choice probability.
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First, recall from Section 2.4.1, uCk can be identified up to the scale φ. Now turn to
yCk and dCk . From the perspective of the parties that observe the state, the sequence
of events in the bargaining process is deterministic. The only uncertainty comes
from actual duration following an agreement (i.e., TCk). So TCk is a random variable.
However, the econometrician does not observe the state s. Thus, from the perspective
of the econometrician, expected duration dCk(·, T¯ , R, piCk , σICk ) : S → [0, T¯ ] is also a
random variable.
Let Fd(d
Ck |T¯ , R, piCk , σICk ) be the conditional distribution of expected duration.
Write fd(·|·) for the conditional density; the conditional density has support [0, d¯],
where d¯ < T¯ is the upper bound on the expectation of government duration. Let
FT (t
Ck |dCk ; T¯ , R, piCk , σICk ) be the conditional distribution of the actual duration.
Write fT (·|·) the conditional density; the conditional density has support [0, T¯ ]. In
addition, FT (·|·) satisfies the restriction E
[
TCk
∣∣dCk ; T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )] = dCk . There
are specific assumptions on Fd(·|·) and FT (·|·) that will be described later.
Now from the perspective of econometrician, yCk(·) solves
yCk = δ
∫
max
{
uCkdCk , yCk
}
dFd(d
Ck |T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )
This uses Bargaining-Cutoff Condition (Equation (2.1)). With this, Equations (2.5)
and (2.6) can be written as
Pr
(
τCk |k, Ck, Z; θ
)
=
[
Fd
(
yCk
uCk
|T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )
)]τ−1 [
1− Fd
(
yCk
uCk
|T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )
)]
and
Pr
(
tCk |l2 . . . lτCk , τCk , k, Ck, Z; θ
)
=
∫ d¯
yCk/uCk
fT (t
Ck |dCk ; T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )dFd(dCk |T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )
1− Fd( yCkuCk |T¯ , R, piCk , σICk )
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Following Merlo (1997) and Diermeier et al. (2003), assume Fd(· |·) and FT (· |·)
belong to the family of beta distributions 7 . In particular, let
fd
(
dC
∣∣C, T¯ , R, piC , σIC ) = γ (T¯ , R, piC , σIC)
 [dC]γ(,T¯ ,R,piC ,σIC )−1[
d¯
(
T¯ , R
)]γ(C,T¯ ,R,piC ,σIC )

where dC ∈ [0, d¯ [T¯ , R]],
γ(T¯ , R, piC , σ2IC ) = exp{(γ0 + γ1piC + γ2piC
2
)MINOR
+ (γ3 + γ4pi
C + γ5pi
C2)MAJOR + γ6σIC + γ7σIC
2
+ (γ8INVEST + γ9NEG+ γ10CCONF)pi
C
+ (γ11INVEST + γ12NEG+ γ13CCONF)σIC
+ (γ14FIXEL+ γ15(1− FIXEL)T¯ )}
and
d¯
(
T¯ , R
)
=
 0.9T¯ if FIXEL = 1,exp(λ0+λ1INVEST)
1+exp(λ0+λ1INVEST)
0.9T¯ if FIXEL = 0.
Furthermore, let
fT (t
C |dC ; T¯ , R, piC , σIC ) = 1
B
(
ζ(C,T¯ ,R,piC ,σIC )dC
T¯−dC , ζ
(
C, T¯ , R, piC , σIC
))
×
[tC]
ζ(C,T¯ ,R,piC,σIC )d
C
T¯−dC −1
[
T¯ − tC]ζ(C,T¯ ,R,piC ,σIC )−1[
T¯
] ζ(C,T¯ ,R,piC,σIC )dC
T¯−dC +ζ(C,T¯ ,R,pi
C ,σ
IC )−1

where tC ∈ [0, T¯ ], B (·, ·) denotes the beta function, and
ζ
(
C, T¯ , R, piC , σ2IC
)
= exp(ζ0MINOR + ζ1MAJOR + ζ2σIC
+ (ζ3INVEST + ζ4NEG + ζ5CCONF)pi
C
+ (ζ6INVEST + ζ7NEG + ζ8CCONF)σIC
+ (ζ9FIXEL + ζ10(1− FIXEL)T¯ ))
7These assumptions make the parameterizations of Fd(·|·) and FT (·|·) highly flexible.
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So the model parameters are (α, δ, φ, ρ, γ, ζ, λ), where α = (α0, α1, α2), γ =
(γ0, . . . , γ15), ζ = (ζ0, . . . , ζ10) and λ = (λ0, λ1).
2.5 Estimation Results
Table 6 reports the maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters of the model.
That is, it gives estimates of θ = (α, δ, φ, ρ, γ, ζ, λ) 8 . These estimates will be used
for the results in Sections 2.7-3.4. Many of the estimates do not have a natural
substantive interpretation. We now discuss those that do. We then turn to the
‘goodness of fit’ of the model in Section 2.6.
Likelihood of Being the Formateur Refer to Equation (1.1). Note that α0
draws a relationship between size and the probability of being formateur; α1 draws
a relationship between incumbency and the probability of being formateur. The
relationship between size (respectively, incumbency) and the probability of being
formateur is nonlinear. This implies that the effect of size (respectively, incumbency)
on the probability of being formateur will depend on both the estimates of α0 and
α1.
The relationship between size and the selection of formateur is addressed by cal-
culating the elasticity of the probability that party i is the formateur with respect
to party i’s size: ∂ ln pi/∂ ln pii = α0pii(1− pi), where pi depends on both α0 and α1.
For each party in the sample, we can compute the average elasticity across all obser-
vations. We then use this to compute the average elasticity across all parties. The
estimate of this elasticity is 1.079, with an associated standard error of 0.09. This
means that when the party’s size increases by 1%, the probability of being formateur
8The standard errors are estimated by a bootstrap approach. This paper simulates 100 bootstrap
samples. In each boot strap sample, it draws 200 government observations from the original sam-
ple (with replacement) and estimates the coefficients in likelihood function using these bootstrap
samples. All stand errors in this paper are based on this same bootstrap approach
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Variable Estimates Standard Error Variable Estimates Standard Error
α1 8.678 0.97 δ 0.807 0.01
α2 1.683 0.22 γ0 -1.468 0.05
α3 1.947 0.22 γ1 11.474 0.27
ζ0 0.238 0.07 γ2 -9.758 0.44
ζ1 0.082 0.09 γ3 8.667 0.23
ζ2 -1.187 0.11 γ4 -12.222 0.53
ζ3 -0.845 0.08 γ5 3.634 0.26
ζ4 -5.855 0.19 γ6 -0.243 0.11
ζ5 -2.439 0.15 γ7 -0.393 0.05
ζ6 1.304 0.11 γ8 -2.093 0.12
ζ7 1.486 0.12 γ9 4.080 0.32
ζ8 1.864 0.23 γ10 -1.603 0.15
ζ9 1.882 0.09 γ11 0.830 0.04
ζ10 0.151 0.08 γ12 -2.773 0.10
λ0 1.479 0.02 γ13 2.860 0.08
λ1 -1.152 0.03 γ14 -3.939 0.10
ρ 1681.336 399.90 γ15 -2.013 0.09
φ 20.870 0.01 Log Likelihood -2084.234
Table 2.6 – Maximum Likelihood Estimates (200 Observations)
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increases by approximately 1%. As a consequence, if a party splits or merges, it will
not affect the party’s likelihood of being formateur.
The relationship between incumbency and the selection of formateur is addressed
by calculating the incumbency premium. This is the additional likelihood of party
i being the formateur when party i is the incumbent vs. when party i is not the
incumbent. We can use two different measures of the incumbency premium. The
first measure calculates the premium for each party i that is the incumbent, and
then computes the average across those parties; the second measure calculates the
premium for each party i that is not the incumbent, and then computes the average
across those parties.
For the first measure, consider a party i that contains the former prime minister.
Let pi be the likelihood that party i is the formateur. Holding all else equal, let p¯
j
i
be the likelihood that party i is the formateur when party j 6= i is the incumbent.
Write p¯i =
∑
p¯ji
N−1 . This is the average likelihood that party i is the formateur when its
incumbency advantage is removed. The first measure calculates party i’s incumbency
premium as pi − p¯i, and then computes the average across all parties that contain
the former prime minister. The average estimate for this measure is 0.289, with an
associated standard error of 0.06. This means that, controlling for size, on average
an incumbent party is 28.9% more likely to be selected as formateur than it would
be if it were not the incumbent.
For the second measure, consider a party i that does not contain the former prime
minister. Let p¯′i be the average likelihood that party i is the formateur when party i
is not the incumbent. Holding all else equal, let p′i be the likelihood that party i is the
formateur when party i is the incumbent. The second measure calculates party i’s
incumbency premium as p′i− p¯′i, and then computes the average across all parties that
do not contain the former prime minister. The average estimate of this measure is
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0.167, with an associated standard error of 0.05. This means that, controlling for size,
on average, a non-incumbent party is 16.7% less likely to be selected as formateur
than it would be if it were the incumbent.
Preference for Policy vs. Office Perks The premise of this dissertation is that
legislators are motivated by both ideology and office benefits. Each of these incentives
has been discussed in the theoretical literature. (See Hotelling (1929), Wittman
(1983), Calvert (1985), Callander (2008).) The estimated model allows us to partially
address the extent to which legislators are, in practice, motivated by ideology over
office benefits. Specifically, it allows us to address the extent to which all parties
within a given (perhaps unobserved) coalition are motivated by ideology over office
benefits, relative to what equilibrium in the bargaining game would be.
This is addressed by making use of the estimates for both φ and (bi : i ∈ C) for all
proto-coalitions C ⊆ N . Specifically, for each (possibly unobserved) proto-coalition
C, compute C’s equilibrium payoff from policy relative to office benefits∑
i∈C bi exp[−(Ii − IC)2]
φ
. (2.7)
Notice that, bi exp[−(Ii − IC)2] is party i’s ideological preference, which is the
estimated preference weight bi times a metric of party i’s ideological distance to
government policy. So a coalition’s ideological preference is the sum over ideological
preferences of all parties in that coalition, i.e., the numerator of Equation (2.7).
The denominator of Equation (2.7) is the total benefits for a coalition, which is the
estimate φ. So a coalition’s preference weight of ideology over office benefits is the
coalition’s ideological preference divided by the total office benefits for that coalition.
The average of this measure across all proto-coalitions C is about 9.45%. The
maximum of this measure (across all proto-coalitions C) is about 32.27%. The average
of this measure across all realized governments in data is about 4.40%. The maximum
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of this measure (across all realized governments) is about 11.99%. This indicates that,
in equilibrium, coalitions care more about office benefits than policy.
Distaste for Bargaining The estimate of the distaste for bargaining is 0.807 with
a standard error of 0.095. This implies a moderate distaste for bargaining on the part
of political parties.
2.6 Goodness of Fit
This section addresses the fit of the model. In particular, it focuses on five observed
variables and compares the density functions predicted by the model to the density
functions in the data. These five variables are the formateur’s seat share, the number
of attempts to form a government, government duration, the size of the government,
and the ideological diversity of the government.
Refer to Tables 2.7-2.11. These tables put the q = 200 observations of each
variable into one of 1, . . . , H bins. Within each bin, it computes the empirical density
function of the variable from the data, g(·), and the predicted density function from
the model gˆ(·). It evaluates how well the model fits the data by Pearson’s χ2 test. In
particular, it assumes that
q
∑
j=1,...,H
[g(j)− gˆ(j)]
gˆ(j)
,
follows a χ2 distribution with H − 1 degrees of freedom. The last row of each table
shows that the χ2 goodness of fit test does not reject the model at conventional
significance levels.
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Interval Data Model
0%-10% 0.025 0.044
10%-20% 0.085 0.058
20%-30% 0.135 0.128
30%-40% 0.215 0.228
40%-50% 0.445 0.451
50%+ 0.095 0.092
χ2 test 4.359
Pr(χ2(5) ≥ 4.359) 0.499
Table 2.7 – Density Functions of Formateur Size and Goodness-of-Fit
Interval Data Model
1 0.610 0.606
2 0.205 0.189
3 0.085 0.087
4 0.065 0.046
5 0.020 0.026
6 0.005 0.015
7 0.010 0.010
8+ 0.000 0.021
χ2 test 7.858
Pr()χ2(7) ≥ 7.858) 0.345
Table 2.8 – Density Function of Attempts and Goodness-of-Fit
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Interval Data Model
0-1 yr 0.360 0.352
1 yr - 2 yr 0.315 0.224
2 yr - 3 yr 0.165 0.219
3 yr - 4 yr 0.140 0.196
4 yr - 5 yr 0.020 0.018
χ2 test 13.274
Pr(χ2(4) ≥ 13.274) 0.151
Table 2.9 – Density Functions of Government Duration and Goodness-of-Fit
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Interval Data Model
0%-10% 0.000 0.001
10%-20% 0.010 0.013
20%-30% 0.010 0.034
30%-40% 0.095 0.100
40%-50% 0.330 0.300
50%-60% 0.350 0.327
60%-70% 0.130 0.130
70%-80% 0.045 0.049
80%-90% 0.025 0.035
90%-100% 0.005 0.011
χ2 test 6.036
Pr(χ2(9) ≥ 6.036) 0.812
Table 2.10 – Density Functions of Government Size and Goodness-of-Fit
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Interval Data Model
0-0.1 0.400 0.339
0.1-0.35 0.115 0.113
0.35-0.48 0.085 0.076
0.48-0.75 0.115 0.155
>0.75 0.285 0.318
χ2 test 5.178
Pr(χ2(4) ≥ 5.178) 0.270
Table 2.11 – Density Functions of Ideological Diversity and Goodness-of-Fit
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2.7 Equilibrium Analysis
How does size affect expected government duration? How does ideological di-
versity affect expected government duration? This section studies the effect of size
(respectively, ideological diversity) on duration, holding fixed ideological diversity
(respectively, size).
In answering these questions, the term expected government duration can take on
two meanings. The first is unconditional expected duration (i.e., expected duration
before a government is formed). This is measured by Eˆ[dC |T¯ = 1000, piC , σIC , Ri].
The second is conditional expected duration (i.e., expected duration conditional upon
forming the government). This is measured by Eˆ[dC |dC > yC(T¯ = 1000, piC , σIC , Ri)].
To compute the effect of size (respectively, ideological diversity) on expected du-
ration, this paper focuses on the quantiles of size and ideological diversity within
which most of the observations lie. Figures 2.7-2.22 report these effects. The upper
left graphs show the (partial equilibrium) effects of size on duration, at low, medium
and high levels of ideological diversity. The upper right graphs show the effects of
ideological diversity on duration, at low, medium and high levels of size. Figures 2.7
through 2.22 differ in their institutional environments.
The effect of size on duration is non-decreasing for minority governments and non-
increasing for majority governments under all institutional environments. Moreover,
changing any one institutional rule—holding all other institutional rules in the en-
vironment constant—does not have a large effect on the rate at which size increases
duration.
The effect of ideological diversity on duration varies across institutional envi-
ronments. In particular, for some institutional environments increasing ideological
diversity increases duration, while for other institutional environments it decreases
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duration. Adding the investiture vote or adding a constructive vote of no confidence
to the institutional environment appears to add a positive trend to the effect of ideo-
logical diversity on duration. Adding a negative parliamentarism to the institutional
environment appears to add a negative trend to the effect of ideological diversity
on duration. Adding a fixed interelection period appears to have no effect on the
relationship between ideological diversity and duration.
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Chapter 3
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND GOVERNMENT FORMATION IN
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES
3.1 Introduction
How do institutions influence government outcomes? Chapter 2 studied the effect
of changing an institution on the specific outcome of duration, holding fixed the com-
position of the government, i.e., ideological diversity and size. For instance, adding
the investiture vote to the institutional environment serves to decrease duration for
any given level of ideological diversity and size. This is the direct effect on duration.
The analysis in Chapter 2 was incomplete for two reasons. First, the direct ef-
fect of changing institutions on duration may lead the formateur to make a different
choice of coalition. This may, in turn, have indirect effects on both policy and govern-
ment duration. Second, the analysis was silent about policy implications. However,
understanding the effects on policy requires understanding how parliamentary char-
acteristics and institutions change the actual choice of coalition.
This chapter turns to the question of how parliamentary characteristics and in-
stitutions affect the choice of coalition and coalitional outcomes, by pinning down
the actual choice of coalition. In particular, this chapter uses the estimated model in
Chapter 2 to predict the composition of the government and government outcomes
associated with different institutional environment, i.e. it conducts the counterfactual
experiments by varying institutions. In so doing, we can address (a) which institu-
tions leads to ‘good’ government outcomes; and (b) how should we reform current
institutions.
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The results of counterfactual experiments have important implications both for
the composition of the Government and for institutional reform. Begin with the
composition of the Government. The counterfactual experiments show that both the
ideological diversity and size of the Government vary across institutions. For instance,
adding an investiture vote increases the ideological diversity of the Government and
typically also increases the size of the Government. See Section 3.4. The predictions
match the data feature that we described in Section 1.4 of Chapter 1.
Now turn to the question of institutional reform. Within parliamentary democra-
cies, institutions are typically evaluated by the length of government duration. (See
e.g. Taylor and Herman (1971), Dodd (1976), Sanders and Herman (1971), Warwick
(1979), Lijphart (1984), Strøm (1985), Warwick (1994), Diermeier et al. (2003), etc.)
The implicit assumption is that Governments with longer duration are better—in
parliamentary democracies, longer duration should be associated with stability and,
so, better policies. However, the counterfactual experiments show that the implicit
assumption may fail: Governments with longer duration may also come with larger
ideological losses for voters. In particular, the set of institutions associated with the
largest length of government duration also comes with significant ideological losses for
voters. Thus, a given institutional reform should be evaluated relative to a benchmark
based on both duration and policy. Interestingly, the counterfactual experiments show
that the set of institutions that minimize ideological losses for voters is also associated
with a long length of government duration. (It differs from the maximum length of
government duration by only six days.) See Section 3.4.
The counterfactual experiments also highlight the fact that an institutional change
must be evaluated relative to other rules in the environment. The typical exercise is
to evaluate a given institutional reform, holding all other features of the environment
constant. The implicit assumption is that there are no synergies between institu-
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tions. But the counterfactual experiments show that there are important synergies.
For instance, positive parliamentarism decreases voters’ ideological losses only in the
presence of either a constructive vote of no confidence or a fixed interelection pe-
riod. Likewise, a constructive vote of no confidence increases duration if and only if
positive parliamentarism is required by the institutional environment. (Section 3.4
discusses additional synergies.) Thus, synergies between institutions have important
implications for normative political economy.
3.2 Voters’ Ideological Losses
To compute voters’ ideological losses, we assume that the electoral outcome reflects
voters’ ideological positions. More specifically, we assume, that prior to the game,
there is an electoral stage. In the electoral stage, there is a unit mass of voters, who
each vote sincerely. These votes are exogenous to the coalition formation process.
Thus, using the seat distribution and ideological positions of the elected parties, we
can back out the ideological composition of voters. We can then compute voters’
ideological losses by integrating the squared distance between voter ideology and the
government policy 1 .
Notice, because voters elect the parliament, it is assumed that the election out-
comes represent the voters’ preferences. But these preferences need not be reflected
by the government outcomes. (The government is not elected directly by voters.)
There may be a gap between the voter preferences and government outcomes. This
gap may differ according to different institutions. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will point to
how different institutional environments influence this gap.
1The ideological loss of a government formed by coalition C is
∑
i∈C pii(Ii − IC)2.
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3.3 An Example
We now use an example to illustrate how parliamentary characteristics and in-
stitutions affect the choice of coalition and government outcomes. Assume there are
three parties in the parliament, 1, 2, 3. Let party 1 be the formateur. So the set of
possible proto-coalitions is
∆ = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}.
The seat share distribution is pi = (0.407, 0.477, 0.116). Parties’ ideological positions
are I = (0.4, 0.3,−0.4) and parties do not differ in their preference weights. Take the
time to next election to be T¯ = 1000. The institutional environment is (INVEST =
Y,PARL = +,CVOTE = N,FIX = N). We use the estimated model to compute
the associated outcomes of the game, for each possible coalition. We then pin down
the formateur’s choice of the coalition, i.e., compute the likelihood that any given
coalition is chosen as the proto-coalition.
Coalition Likelihood Size Dissimilarity Duration Ideological Loss
{1} 0.459 0.407 0.000 380 0.079
{1,2} 0.027 0.884 0.071 269 0.067
{1,3} 0.497 0.523 0.566 451 0.127
{1,2,3} 0.017 1.000 0.436 227 0.074
Expected 0.49 0.29 409 0.10
Table 3.1 – Benchmark Case
Table 3.1 reports the likelihood of each possible coalition being the proto-coalition
and the associated size, ideological diversity, government duration and ideological
losses for voters. Under this environment, C = {1, 3} is the coalition that is most
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likely to be formed. This is an ideologically disconnected coalition. It can be shown
that the associated government policy for this coalition is IC = 0. This results in the
largest voter ideological losses, since it is assumed that the election outcome represent
the voters’ preferences.
We next change parliamentary characteristics and institutions. This will influence
the formateur’s choice of the coalition and the associated government outcomes.
Changing Parliamentary Characteristics In the benchmark case, each party
in the parliament had a minority seat share. We now change the parliamentary
characteristics by increasing the seat share of party 1 to a majority. (This changes
the ideological composition of the parliament.) The seat share distribution is now
pi′ = (0.507, 0.377, 0.116). For this new parliament, Table 3.2 reports the likelihood of
each possible coalition being the proto-coalition and the associated size, ideological
diversity, government duration and ideological losses for voters. In this parliament,
C ′ = {1} is the coalition that is most likely to be formed. Now, the formateur
excludes the ideologically extreme party 3. This results in shorter duration and
smaller ideological losses for voters.
Coalition Likelihood Size Dissimilarity Duration Ideological Loss
{1} 0.673 0.507 0.000 449 0.078
{1,2} 0.018 0.884 0.071 269 0.067
{1,3} 0.300 0.623 0.566 409 0.134
{1,2,3} 0.009 1.000 0.436 227 0.078
Expected 0.55 0.17 432 0.09
Table 3.2 – Changing Parliament
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This change in parliamentary characteristics changes the formateur’s choice of
coalition. One reason the formateur may make this change is because the institutional
environment contains an investiture vote. Recall, if the environment contains an
investiture vote, the government needs a vote by parliament to legally assume office.
In the benchmark case, the formateur is a minority party; with an investiture vote
in place, the formateur has an incentive to include an additional party to achieve a
majority. When we change formateur’s seat share to a majority, the formateur looses
this incentive to include another party and so forms a coalition by itself.
Changing Institution Return to the benchmark example. Now, instead, remove
the investiture vote from the institutional environment. Table 3.3 reports the for-
mateur’s choice of coalition and the associated government outcomes. When the
investiture vote is removed, the formateur loses the incentive to form a majority
coalition. Now, C ′ = {1} is again the coalition that is most likely to be formed. The
formateur again excludes the ideologically extreme party 3. This now results in a
longer duration and smaller ideological losses for voters.
Coalition Likelihood Size Dissimilarity Duration Ideological Loss
{1} 0.662 0.407 0.000 590 0.079
{1,2} 0.018 0.884 0.071 529 0.067
{1,3} 0.313 0.523 0.566 650 0.127
{1,2,3} 0.006 1.000 0.436 464 0.074
Expected 0.46 0.18 607 0.09
Table 3.3 – Changing Institution
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3.4 Simulation
This section builds on the example to conduct counterfactual institutional ex-
periments. In particular, it considers an artificial political system with five parties
N = {1, . . . , 5} and T¯ = 1000. It simulates the outcomes of 100 elections by ran-
domly drawing (a) vectors of the parties’ seat shares in parliament from a uniform
distribution on Π = (pi1, . . . , pi5 : pii ∈ (0, 0.5),
∑
i∈N pii = 1), (b) vectors of ideological
positions from a uniform distribution on [−2, 2], (c) the identity of the party that
contains the former prime minister, and (d) vectors of raw preference weights from a
uniform distribution on [0, 20] 2 . For each draw of parliamentary characteristics and
each possible coalition configuration thereof, it uses the estimated model to compute
the predicted distribution of negotiation rounds, government duration, and govern-
ment policy. It then averages across all draws of parliamentary characteristics and
coalitional configurations.
This simulation is repeated under 16 different institutional environments. These
correspond to whether the environment has an investiture vote (INVEST=Y), nega-
tive parliamentarism (PARL=-), a constructive vote of no confidence (CVOTE=Y),
and a fixed interelection period (FIX=1). Table 3.4 gives notation for the combination
of institutional rules.
Table 3.5 provides the simulation results. Notice, government size differs across
institutional environments. It ranges from 45% to 55%, encompassing both minor-
ity and majority governments. Government duration also differs across institutional
environments, ranging from 172.21 to 749.44 days. A longer government duration
can be associated with both better and worse policies from the perspective of voter
welfare. The set of institutional rules with the longest government duration involves
2The range of the draws is the same as the raw data of preference weights.
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Notation INVEST PARL CVOTE FIX Notation INVEST PARL CVOTE FIX
R1 N + N N R9 N + N Y
R2 Y + N N R10 Y + N Y
R3 N - N N R11 N - N Y
R4 Y - N N R12 Y - N Y
R5 N + Y N R13 N + Y Y
R6 Y + Y N R14 Y + Y Y
R7 N - Y N R15 N - Y Y
R8 Y - Y N R16 Y - Y Y
Table 3.4 – Institutional Environments
no investiture vote, positive parliamentarism, a constructive vote of no confidence,
and a fixed interelection period (R13). However, this set of institutions has signifi-
cant ideological losses for voters. Now, add an investiture vote to this environment,
i.e., go to R14. This new institutional environment minimizes the voters’ ideological
losses and results in decreasing government duration by only 6 days. Interestingly,
the institutional environment that has the shortest duration (R8) has large ideological
losses for voters and the institutional environment with the largest ideological losses
for voters (R2) has a relatively short duration.
We now highlight how changing various institutions effects both the composition
of the government and government outcomes.
Investiture Vote Adding an investiture vote to the institutional environment in-
creases the ideological diversity of governments. It typically also increases the size of
governments. (The exception is when an investiture vote is added to the environment
that has a positive parliamentarism, a constructive vote of no confidence, and a fixed
interelection period.) It typically decreases government duration. (The exception
is when an investiture vote is added to the environment that has a negative parlia-
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Institution Duration Attempts Size Ideology Std Gov Policy Ideological Loss
R1 583.37 1.64 0.49 0.35 -0.01 11.20
(19.56) (0.14) (0.05) (0.1) (1.39) (10.54)
R2 391.37 2.24 0.53 0.50 -0.24 12.71
(7.93) (0.13) (0.03) (0.16) (1.27) (9.29)
R3 352.18 1.22 0.45 0.18 -0.04 10.39
(72.76) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (1.69) (8.65)
R4 192.35 1.52 0.52 0.31 0.19 10.86
(35.6) (0.17) (0.05) (0.07) (1.2) (8.11)
R5 607.13 1.39 0.51 0.62 0.33 10.17
(29.19) (0.14) (0.03) (0.24) (1.08) (9.26)
R6 419.47 1.76 0.55 0.70 -0.05 8.34
(34.04) (0.37) (0.05) (0.23) (0.96) (7)
R7 233.97 1.24 0.49 0.32 0.10 10.41
(58.38) (0.08) (0.05) (0.11) (1.24) (6.82)
R8 172.21 1.39 0.54 0.48 0.00 10.23
(58.76) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (1.1) (7.48)
R9 670.53 2.24 0.51 0.40 0.23 9.41
(22.57) (0.22) (0.02) (0.12) (1.17) (6.53)
R10 625.96 2.92 0.52 0.55 -0.14 9.46
(26.11) (0.35) (0.02) (0.16) (1.12) (7.18)
R11 543.33 1.56 0.46 0.17 -0.04 9.96
(78.69) (0.24) (0.07) (0.07) (1.49) (5.57)
R12 479.80 1.97 0.47 0.20 0.04 10.88
(61.15) (0.3) (0.05) (0.06) (1.65) (8)
R13 749.44 1.60 0.52 0.76 0.01 9.45
(41.91) (0.31) (0.04) (0.3) (1.16) (8.73)
R14 743.48 1.75 0.51 0.88 -0.06 7.42
(54.52) (0.49) (0.04) (0.3) (1.09) (7.08)
R15 392.76 1.49 0.52 0.40 -0.10 10.76
(72.13) (0.11) (0.04) (0.13) (1.29) (9.54)
R16 430.04 1.75 0.53 0.53 -0.08 9.50
(89.53) (0.12) (0.03) (0.16) (1.02) (6.82)
Table 3.5 – Simulation Result
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mentarism, a constructive vote of no confidence, and a fixed interelection period.)
It decreases voters’ ideological losses if and only if there is a constructive vote of no
confidence.
Positive versus Negative Parliamentarism Positive parliamentarism increases
the ideological diversity of governments. It typically also increases the size of govern-
ments. (The exception is when positive parliamentarism is required in the presence
of an investiture vote, a constructive vote of no confidence, and a fixed interelection
period.) It increases government duration. It decreases voters’ ideological losses in
the presence of either a constructive vote of no confidence or a fixed interelection
period. Otherwise, it increases voters’ ideological losses.
Constructive Vote of No Confidence Adding a constructive vote of no confi-
dence increases the ideological diversity of governments. It typically also increases the
size of governments. (The exception is when a constructive vote of no confidence is
added to the environment that has an investiture vote, positive parliamentarism, and
a fixed interelection period.) It increases duration under positive parliamentarism
but decreases it under negative parliamentarism. It has mixed effects on voters’ ide-
ological losses. In the presence of an investiture vote it decreases voters’ ideological
losses.
Fixed Interelection Period Adding a fixed interelection period typically increases
ideological diversity. (The exception comes when there is neither positive parliamen-
tarism nor a constructive vote of no confidence.) It increases size if and only there
is no investiture vote. A fixed interelection period increases government duration. It
typically decreases voters’ ideological losses. (There are two exceptions.)
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Notice that the effect of adding any one institution to the environment has different
effects on government outcomes, depending on the other institutional rules already in
place. These effects can be different from the direct effects we studied in Section 2.7.
For instance, consider adding a constructive vote of no confidence to an institutional
environment. Section 2.7 shows that this has a direct effect of increasing government
duration. Here we see that it can increase or decrease government duration, de-
pending on whether there is positive or negative parliamentarism in the environment.
Apparently, adding a constructive vote of no confidence has an indirect effect: It may
cause the formateur to change its choice of coalition and, in turn, change the associ-
ated government outcomes. The formateur’s incentive to change its coalitional choice
appears to depend on whether the environment requires positive parliamentarism.
This last fact has important implications for normative political economy. Typ-
ically, institutional changes are evaluated by studying the effect of adding a given
institution to an institution-free environment. We now see that, in practice, there
may be synergies between institutional rules. As a consequence, it is necessary to
evaluate the effect of adding a given institution to ‘rich’ institutional environments.
3.5 Discussion: Synergies Between Institutions
The counterfactual experiments suggest there are important synergies between
institutions. We now use an example to illustrate why these synergies arise.
Example: Italy vs. Denmark Notice that the current institutional environments
of Italy and Denmark are R2 and R3 respectively. In particular, as mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.4, the current set of institutions in Italy R2 leads to the largest ideological losses
for voters. It also leads to relatively short duration. We now think about a particular
institutional reform—adding a constructive vote of no confidence to the current insti-
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tutional environment of Italy (i.e. moving from R2 to R6). (i.e. moving from R2 to
R6) The institution—constructive vote of no confidence—was first introduced by West
Germany to increase stability. In fact, it does improve stability for the institutional
environment of Italy. Moreover, it also decrease votes’ ideological losses. By contrast,
we now consider implementing the same institutional reform in Denmark (i.e. moving
from R3 to R7). This would have negative consequences. This institutional reform
would decrease duration and increase voters’ ideological losses. These differences in
the effects of a same institutional reform on government outcomes are caused by the
synergies between institutions. Notice that, the current institutional environments
of these two countries differ. In Italy, the institutional environment has an investi-
ture vote, positive parliamentarism; while in Denmark, the institutional environment
does not have an investiture vote and only requires negative parliamentarism. Thus,
whether adding a constructive vote of no confidence is beneficial depends on whether
there are investiture vote and positive/negative parliamentarism. That means, there
are synergies between investiture vote, positive/negative parliamentarism and con-
structive vote of no confidence.
Why is it that—when we add a constructive vote of no confidence to one en-
vironment is beneficial—but to the other environment, it is detrimental? Start by
thinking about the environments in Italy and Denmark. In Italy there is an investi-
ture vote and positive Parliamentarism; so, the government needs a majority support
of Parliament to both assume office and remain in office. In this institutional environ-
ment, the government is highly accountable to Parliament. By contrast, In Denmark
the environment does not have an investiture vote and only requires negative parlia-
mentarism. So in the institutional environment of Denmark, the government is less
accountable to Parliament.
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Recall, a constructive vote of no confidence requires Parliament to find an al-
ternate government, before it replaces the current government. So, when there is a
constructive vote of no confidence, the Formateur has an incentive to create coali-
tions that are larger and more ideologically diverse—to make it more difficult for
Parliament to find a replacement. In fact, these incentives bear out in the simula-
tions: adding a constructive vote typically increases both ideological diversity and
size. (See Section 3.4.) But, there may be many ways to increase ideological diversity
and size—which parties the Formateur wants to include in its coalition depends on
the other institutions in place.
Now consider adding a Constructive Vote of No Confidence in an environment
of high accountability. In this case, the formateur would have an incentive to in-
clude parties that the parliament favors. We would expect to see a coalition—and
so policy—that is closer to that of the parliament. Since the parliament represents
voters’ policy preferences, we would expect the policy that is consistent with voters’
policy preferences. As a consequence, this may make it more likely for the government
to survive. Instead, think about adding a Constructive Vote of No Confidence in an
environment of low accountability. In this case, the formateur would have an incen-
tive to include parties that itself favors. We would expect to see a coalition—and so
policy—that is further afield from that of Parliament, and so the voters’ policy pref-
erences. As a consequence, this may make it more likely that members of Parliament
attempt to overthrow to government—so we may end up with shorter duration.
The above example gives one explanation why these synergies arise: These syn-
ergies may be caused by strategic incentives amongst parties in coalition formation
process. To further understand how exactly the strategic interaction cause these
synergies and thus influence government outcomes requires future work.
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